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Of Crucifixes and Headscarves:  
Religious Symbols in German Schools
Tobias Lock1
The status of religious symbols in German schools has been a hotly debated topic 
not only in legal circles but also in the wider public domain for almost 20 years. 
The debate started with the conflict over the crucifix in classrooms, continued 
with the right of teachers to wear a headscarf at school and currently centres 
upon a possible ban of the headscarf for students. For instance a newly appointed 
minister of the Land of Lower Saxony suggested that crosses should be banned 
from classrooms (Schneider 2010). Germany’s most prominent feminist Alice 
Schwarzer argued that girls should not be allowed to wear a headscarf at school 
(Spiegel Online 2010a). This contribution examines these issues from a legal 
perspective. It is divided into three sections: the first section is concerned with 
religious symbols installed by the State, the second section deals with religious 
symbols worn by teachers and the third section will examine whether students 
can be prevented from wearing religious symbols. This chapter aims to bring 
insights into the limits to the freedom of religion, the notion and content of the 
negative freedom of religion, the demand for neutrality of the German state in 
religious and philosophical matters and the interpretation of symbols as religious. 
The contribution is mainly based on the case law of the Federal Constitution Court 
(‘FCC’) but also considers the judgments of the lower courts and the relevant 
legislation, including the transposition of the equality directives of the European 
Union (‘EU’) into national law.
The legal framework for the discussion is as follows: Article 4 of the German 
constitution or Grundgesetz (‘Basic Law’) guarantees freedom of religion, faith 
and conscience:
(1) Freedom of faith and of conscience, and freedom to profess a religious or 
philosophical creed, shall be inviolable.
(2) T e undisturbed practice of religion shall be guaranteed.
1 I would like to thank Dr Javier García Oliva (University of Manchester) for his 
valuable comments on an earlier draft, Ms Claudia Müller for her assistance in researching 
for this chapter and the editor for accepting it and editing it together with Arman Sarvarian 
to whom I also express my gratitude. All errors remain, of course, my own.
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Law, Religious Freedoms and Education in Europe348
According to German doctrine, freedom of religion has two elements. First, 
everyone enjoys positive freedom of religion. This means that everyone has the 
right to adhere to a religion or to hold a belief (so-called forum internum). This 
includes atheism (Kokott 2007). In addition, everyone has the right to behave 
strictly in accordance with the rules of one’s belief and to act according to one’s 
religious convictions (so-called forum externum). Secondly, negative freedom of 
religion gives everyone the right not to share a certain belief (Kokott 2007). The 
State must not interfere with either of these freedoms. According to the FCC, the 
State is especially prohibited from prescribing a belief (BVerfGE 32, 98, 106; 
BVerGE 93, 1, 15; BVerfGE 108, 282, 297). Freedom of religion is a fundamental 
right enjoyed by everyone, including children and, of course, their parents.
Parents also enjoy a fundamental right to educate their children according to 
Article 6(2) of the Basic Law: ‘The care and upbringing of children is the natural 
right of parents and a duty primarily incumbent upon them. The state shall watch 
over them in the performance of this duty.’ This right, however, is concurrent 
with the State’s duty to educate, which is derived from Article 7(1) of the Basic 
Law providing that the entire school system is under the supervision of the State 
(BVerfGE 34, 165, 183). Thus parents and the State share responsibility to educate 
children.
It should further be pointed out that according to Article 70 of the Basic Law 
the organization of schools lies in the competence of the German states (Länder) 
so that that there are 16 different sets of rules which govern the relations amongst 
schools, students and staff. This means that there can never be a single answer to 
the questions concerning religious symbols in German schools. Rather, we must 
compare 16 different systems. What the Länder, of course, have in common is that 
their legislatures are bound by the constitutional limits on legislative regulation 
set by the Basic Law. It is the ai  of this contribution to precisely illustrate these 
limits and how the Länder have positioned themselves within them.
Finally, Germany does not have a state religion. It is a religiously neutral State. 
According to Article 140 of the Basic Law, Article 137 of the Weimar Constitution 
forms an integral part of the Basic Law and provides that there shall be no state 
church. This means, on the one hand, that the State is free from the influence 
of churches but also, on the other hand, that the churches are free from that of 
the State (Von Campenhausen and de Wall 2006). Moreover, it follows from the 
constitutional right to freedom of religion that the State must be neutral in matters 
of religion and philosophy of life (Weltanschauung) (BVerfGE 93, 1, 16). At 
the same time, there is strong cooperation between religious communities and 
the State. According to Article 137 of the Weimar Constitution, the State grants 
religious communities, most notably the incorporated churches, certain privileges 
such as a right to tax their members. The separation of Church and State is thus 
not strict. The relationship between Church and State is cooperative. This means 
for instance that state authorities are not prevented from religious avowals (Von 
Campenhausen and de Wall 2006). A number of early decisions by the FCC show 
that the State’s neutrality must not be confused with the French (Adrian 2006) and 
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Of Crucifixes and Headscarves: Religious Symbols in German Schools 349
Turkish (Karakas 2007) concepts of laïcité, which postulate a strict separation of 
religion and State. Two decisions of the FCC concerned the legality of legislation 
passed in two Länder which introduced Christian schools. Article 15 of the 
constitution of the Baden-Württemberg Land provided that primary schools (and 
some secondary schools) are Christian comprehensive schools whereas Article 
135 of the Bavarian constitution provided that children in public, prim ry schools 
are educated according to Christian principles. In the Baden-Württemberg case, 
the FCC held that the Länder enjoy a great degree of independence when it comes 
to organizing public schools – including their religious orientation (BVerfGE 41, 
29, 45). It rejected the argument that the State must keep aloof from introducing 
religious references into schools (BVerfGE 41, 29, 48).
However, where the legislator chooses to introduce such references, the 
school must not proselytize or otherwise claim that Christian religious beliefs are 
binding. Rather, such a school must be open to other philosophical and religious 
persuasions and its educational mission must not be religious in character. The 
reference to Christianity is to be understood as the recognition of Christianity as 
a decisive factor in Western history and culture (BVerfGE 41, 29, 51). The FCC 
made a similar finding in its decision on the provision of the Bavarian constitution 
(BVerfGE 41, 65, 78). The Basic Law therefore prescribes ‘open’ neutrality 
(Werdmölder 2007).
This openness towards religious elements introduced by the State into schools 
again arose in the FCC’s decision regarding school prayer (BVerfGE 52, 223). The 
FCC heard two joined cases. In the first case, the parents of a primary school pupil 
complained that the practice to say a daily prayer before school began had been 
abandoned following an objection by another pupil. In the second case, the parents 
of a primary school pupil argued that a school prayer was incompatible with their 
child’s negative freedom of religion. Only the first complaint was successful. The 
FCC recalled that it is possible for the Länder to introduce religious references into 
schools where the freedom of religion of all concerned is not violated (BVerfGE 
52, 223, 238). It acknowledged that it constituted a promotion of Christianity for 
the State to allow a pray r as part of the school day (BVerfGE 52, 223, 240). The 
FCC went on to find that the school prayer was not a violation of the negative 
freedom of religion since the pupil had the possibility to avoid it by either leaving 
the room or simply not participating in the prayer (BVerfGE 52, 223, 248). Thus, a 
school prayer is enerally compatible with the Basic Law. The decision therefore 
shows that Germany does not follow the strict French and Turkish models of 
secularism but a more moderate model of the separation of Church and State.
© Copyrighted Material
© Copyrighted Material
ww
w.
as
hg
at
e.
co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  
Law, Religious Freedoms and Education in Europe350
Symbols Installed by the State: the Crucifix Controversy
Almost 15 years before the Lautsi decision2 by the European Court of Human 
Rights (‘ECtHR’) made the headlines, an almost identical case was decided by 
the FCC (BVerfGE 93, 1). Three siblings and their parents filed a constitutional 
complaint against the mandatory affixing of crucifixes and crosses in classrooms in 
Bavaria. The relevant provision in the Bavarian School Regulations for Elementary 
Schools (Volksschulordnung) provided that ‘[I]n every classroom a cross shall be 
affixed.’ The parents were followers of the anthroposophical philosophy of life 
as taught by Rudolf Steiner. When one of their children started primary school, 
they found large crucifixes affixed to the walls of the classrooms in which she 
was taught. The crucifixes were in direct view of the blackboard. The parents 
requested that the crucifixes be removed. A compromise was found whereby the 
school replaced them with plain crosses, which were affixed above the door. Some 
time later, the parents unsuccessfully requested that the crosses in the classrooms 
be removed as well. The case ended up in the FCC, which in 1995 delivered one 
of the most controversial judgments in its history when it held that the affixing of 
a cross in a classroom violated the complainants’ right to religious freedom.3
The FCC’s Reasoning
The FCC held that the affixing of a cross in a classroom violated pupils’ negative 
religious freedom. The FCC defined ‘negative religious freedom’ as the freedom 
to stay away from acts of worship of a faith not shared, which includes the freedom 
to stay away from the symbols of such a faith (BVerfGE 93, 1, 15). The FCC 
recognized that, in a pluralist society, an individual has no right to be completely 
spared from manifestations of ther faiths. But the difference in the classroom 
was that the State itself created a situation wherein the individual was exposed 
to a religious symbol without any possibility of escape. The FCC’s remarks on 
the cross as a religious symbol, the existence of an interference with freedom of 
religion and the neutrality of the State were most controversial at the time.
The FCC rejected the argument advanced by the Bavarian government that 
the cross was merely a symbol of Western culture marked by Christianity. The 
FCC found that the cross was still the primary symbol of the Christian faith 
(BVerfGE 93, 1, 19). In interpreting the significance of the cross as a Christian 
symbol, the FCC based this finding on an objective assessment of the cross and 
did not take into account the subjective intention of the State affixing it. The FCC 
distinguished the case from the school decisions referred to above. Whilst it found 
that the Christian mission of these schools was the recognition of Christianity as 
2 See notes 4 and 5 infra.
3 In that sense, the labelling of the decision as the ‘crucifix’ decision is a misnomer as 
the complaint was directed against plain crosses as well.
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Of Crucifixes and Headscarves: Religious Symbols in German Schools 351
an important element of Western history and of Western culture, it felt unable to 
interpret the cross in such a narrow way.
The FCC considered the cross to interfere with negative freedom of religion. 
The main rationale was that pupils could not escape the cross during lessons. Since 
education in primary schools was compulsory, pupils were thus forced to study 
‘under the cross’ (BVerfGE 93, 1, 18). This inescapability marked the difference 
with the school prayer decision discussed above. School prayers only happened at 
the beginning of a lesson and pupils had the chance to leave the room or simply 
not participate. Furthermore, the FCC cited its decision on the cross in courtrooms, 
where the display of the cross had also been held to be unconstitutional since a 
duty to argue a case ‘under the cross’ constituted an unreasonable inner burden 
both for the lawyer and the party represented by him (BVerfGE 35, 366). It was 
said that this case relating to courtrooms was not a relevant precedent since the 
FCC had relied on the subjective, inner burden of the p rticular parties – both the 
lawyer and his client in this case were former German nationals who had had to 
flee the country during the Nazi era because they were Jewish (Von Campenhausen 
1996). By contrast, the FCC in the crucifix decision no longer took into account 
the particular circumstances of the individual plaintiff who objected to the cross 
but found crosses in classrooms to generally interfere with freedom of religion. 
The FCC expressly disagreed with the decisions of the lower courts which had 
held that the cross had no effect on pupils. Whilst the FCC admitted that the 
cross did not compel pupils to identify ith it, it ascribed a soliciting character 
to it (BVerfGE 93, 1, 20). This means that the FCC considered that pupils might 
interpret the cross as objectively proselytizing and thus interfering with their 
negative freedom of religion.
The FCC did not regard this interference with freedom of religion to be 
justified. Negative freedom of religion was not an absolute right and, as was held 
in the decision on Christian schools and the school prayer, could be restricted 
because of the State’s right to educate children arising from Article 7 of the Basic 
Law (BVerfGE 93, 1, 20). However, the FCC held that the affixing of a cross 
violated the neutrality of the State in matters of religion and philosophy of life. 
It conceded that it had acknowledged in the decisions on Christian schools that 
the State need not completely abandon all religious or philosophical references 
when educating children. However, when compulsorily educating children, the 
State must fulfil its duty in a non-proselytizing fashion. The affixing of a cross was 
considered to infringe this (BVerfGE 93, 1, 23). Moreover, the FCC made it clear 
that the positive religious freedom of the majority of pupils (who were Christian) 
could not override the right of the minority to be protected since fundamental 
rights were specifically aimed at their protection (BVerfGE 93, 1, 24).
Dissenting Views
The decision of the FCC was not unanimous, however. Three of the eight judges 
rendered a dissenting opinion arguing that there was no violation of the claimants’ 
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Law, Religious Freedoms and Education in Europe352
freedom of religion. The minority dissented on the basis of the school decisions 
according to which there is no a violation of the neutrality requirement if the Länder 
base schools on Christian values. This, they argued, also covered the affixing of a 
cross or crucifix in the classroom (BVerfGE 93, 1, 28). A similar point was made 
by von Campenhausen (1996) and by Müller-Volbehr (1995) who contended that 
if Christian schools were constitutional, then the cross as their symbol had to be 
constitutional as well.
In addition, von Camphausen (1996) and Kokott (2007) criticized the FCC for 
finding that the exposure of pupils to the cross amounted to an interference with the 
negative freedom of religion of non-Christian pupils. One of the reasons advanced 
is that negative freedom of religion does not constitute a superior fundamental right, 
which always trumps freedom of positive religion (BverfGE 93, 1, 31). However, 
this contention by the minority is based on the wrong assumption that the case 
of the crucifix deals with a conflict between the positive freedom of religion of 
Christian pupils and the negative freedom of religion of non-Christian pupils, that 
is essentially a question of horizontal application of fundamental rights (so called 
Drittwirkung). But that was not the issue of the case. Rather, the question was 
whether a binding order by the State to affix crosses in classrooms was compatible 
with Article 4 of the Basic Law, which is a classical vertical situation wherein an 
act of the State interferes with fundamental freedoms.
Moreover, the dissenters contended that, for a non-Christian pupil, the cross 
could not be a religious symbol but could only be a symbol representing Christian 
and Western values. This argument is unconvincing as it essentially negates the 
existence of negative religious freedom. Were it correct, it would mean that the 
manifestation of a religion could never interfere with anyone’s negative freedom 
of religion since, as non-members of that particular religious group, they would 
not be able to understand the religious meaning of that manifestation which, at 
worst, could only amount for them to a nuisance (Borowski 2006). It was further 
argued by Müller-Volbehr (1995) that the effects of ‘studying under the cross’ had 
been exaggerated and could not be proven. The majority was also criticized for not 
making any reference to the position of the cross in the classroom. Müller-Volbehr 
(1995) maintained that it made a difference whether the cross was affixed within 
sight of the pupils or not.
The decision led to an amendment of the Bavarian legislation. Article 7 of 
the Bavarian Code on Education (Bayerisches Erziehungs- und Unterrichtsgesetz) 
still provides that a cross shall be affixed in each classroom. However, it was 
added that where parents object to the affixing of the cross for serious religious 
or philosophical reasons the head teacher must seek agreement with them. Where 
such agreement is impossible, the head teacher is bound to find a solution which 
respects the rights of the minority. The Federal Administrative Court ruled that 
the provision had to be interpreted in light of Article 4 of the Basic Law. It 
found that, in the end, the views of objecting pupils and parents had to prevail 
(Bundesverwaltungsgericht, 6 C 18/98). This, in effect, means that the cross has to 
be removed where they request it.
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Of Crucifixes and Headscarves: Religious Symbols in German Schools 353
Comparison with Lautsi
Given that the facts of the two cases are nearly identical, it seems appropriate to 
draw a short comparison between the FCC’s crucifix decision and the decisions 
by the ECtHR in Lautsi, where the Grand Chamber4 quashed the earlier Chamber5 
judgment. The Grand Chamber adopted a markedly different approach to the FCC, 
which warrants a few comments. I shall provide a three-way comparison between 
the decisions. Both the Chamber and the FCC found that a cross in the classroom 
was in violation of the negative freedom of religion. However, it appears that 
the Chamber’s definition of what constitutes negative freedom of religion was 
not the same as that of the FCC. The Chamber defined it as the freedom not to 
believe. In the FCC’s understanding of freedom of religion, not holding a belief 
would be covered by positive freedom of religion. Negative freedom is defined 
as the right not to have to follow a certain belief and not to be confronted with 
religious manifestations. Whilst it stated the above definition of negative freedom, 
it appears that the Chamber actually applied the FCC’s understanding of negative 
religious freedom when it said that the State must ‘refrain from imposing beliefs’. 
The Grand Chamber did not pronounce on this question. It regarded Article 2 
of Protocol 1 ECHR as lex specialis to Article 9 ECHR. Article 2 guarantees a 
right to education and imposes a duty on the part of the State to ensure education 
in conformity with the religious beliefs of the person educated. The FCC, the 
Chamber and the Grand Chamber all share the view that the crucifix and the cross 
are religious symbols and adopt an objective view when interpreting symbols that 
(also) have a religious meaning.
The most striking differences in the approaches of the FCC and the Chamber 
on the one side, and the Grand Chamber on the other relate to the issue of the 
interference that the cross may cause with the religious freedom of pupils and 
their parents. Both the FCC and the Chamber agreed that a religious symbol can 
interfere with negative freedom of religion where there is no possibility for pupils 
to escape. In contrast to the Chamber, the FCC considered that this interference 
could be justified by the State’s right to organize education. The reason for this 
probably lies in the absence of any such right being mentioned in the European 
Convention on Human Rights 1950 (‘ECHR’). As has been noted by Augsberg 
and Engelbrecht (2010), the ECHR is not a full constitution but only contains 
a number of (individual) human rights. However, the Chamber in Lautsi went 
further than the FCC in its unequivocal statement that the State has a duty to 
(absolute) confessional neutrality in public education, which appears to be the 
same as laïcité. This view is certainly not shared by the FCC, which in the crucifix 
decision confirmed its older case law on Christian schools. It is regrettable that the 
Chamber did not at least provide some arguments as to why the State should have 
a duty to be completely neutral under the Convention. But since this aspect of the 
4 ECtHR Grand Chamber Lautsi v. Italy 18 March 2011, Application no. 30814/06.
5 ECtHR Lautsi v. Italy 3 November 2009, Application no. 30814/06.
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Law, Religious Freedoms and Education in Europe354
decision was not upheld by the Grand Chamber, there are no further implications 
for German schools. In contrast to both FCC and the Chamber, the Grand Chamber 
did not seem to consider that the cross interfered with the religious freedom of 
parents and pupils. The Grand Chamber held that Italy had not overstepped the 
limits of the margin of appreciation granted to it by the Convention when it comes 
to reconciling its functions in relation to education and teaching with the parents’ 
right to ensure such education in conformity with their own religious convictions 
(Grand Chamber judgment: para. 69.).
The limit set by the Grand Chamber is whether the provision of education by 
the Italian State, of which the physical school environment is part, leads to a form 
of indoctrination. The Grand Chamber did not find that the mere presence of the 
cross as a religious symbol led to indoctrination. It held that a crucifix on a wall is 
‘an essentially passive symbol’ (Grand Chamber judgment: para. 72). The Grand 
Chamber thus contradicts the FCC’s findings on this question. It is recalled that 
the FCC highlighted the inescapability of the pupils’ situation and the soliciting 
character of the cross. The Grand Chamber’s reasoning deserves some remarks. 
To begin with, it is regrettable that the reasoning of such an important decision 
remains short and rather unsatisfactory. It is not entirely clear whether the Grand 
Chamber regarded the presence of the religious symbol as a potential interference 
with religious freedom or not. Clarity in this respect is not helped by introducing the 
category of a ‘passive symbol’. Symbols are, one would suggest, always passive. 
They remind us of a religion, brand or nation and so on and evoke associations we 
might have with that particular religion, brand or nation. But they never actively 
speak to us. After the Grand Chamber decision, one must, however, ask whether 
there is such a thing as an ‘active’ symbol and if so, what consequences this 
would have for the decision of a similar case or whether the expression ‘passive 
symbol’ is merely a tautology. Furthermore, the Grand Chamber’s distinguishing 
of the Dahlab decision6 (infra), where the ECHR held that the Muslim headscarf 
constituted a ‘powerful external symbol’ is hardly convincing (Grand Chamber 
judgment, para. 73). The Grand Chamber merely distinguished the two cases on 
the basis of their facts but did not actually address the pertinent question of why the 
headscarf is a more powerful religious symbol than the crucifix. Both are arguably 
equally powerful. More importantly, the Grand Chamber fails to appreciate that 
in Dahlab the symbol was worn by a person who was the bearer of fundamental 
rights whereas in Lautsi the symbol was affixed by the State, which does not enjoy 
fundamental rights (a similar point is made by the dissenting judge Malinverni in 
the Grand Chamber judgment).
One should briefly ask what consequences the Lautsi decision might have for 
Germany. Judging from a legal perspective there are none. The Grand Chamber 
decision objects to indoctrination on the part of the State. It does not regard the 
Italian situation – with a mandatory crucifix on the walls of state classrooms – to 
amount to such indoctrination. One cannot infer that a ban on the cross as it was 
6 Note 7 infra.
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Of Crucifixes and Headscarves: Religious Symbols in German Schools 355
pronounced by the FCC would not be in accordance with the Convention. To the 
contrary, the decision contains no reason for the FCC to alter its case law. However, 
could the Länder, and especially Bavaria, reintroduce a mandatory affixing of the 
cross? As long as the decision of the FCC stands, this is not possible. The decision 
of the Grand Chamber cannot override the FCC’s decision in this respect. The 
protection offered by the Basic Law and voiced by the FCC is thus reater than 
the protection offered by the Convention. Thus the legal situation in Germany has 
not been directly affected by the Lautsi case.
Cases Involving Teachers
A few years after the FCC’s decision, the courts faced the question whether 
the reasoning would also apply to non-Christian teachers who argued that their 
negative freedom of religion was affected by having to ‘teach under the cross’. In 
this scenario, the main difference between a teacher and a pupil is that teachers 
are employed by the State as civil servants so that they owe the State a degree of 
loyalty. This duty of loyalty is considered to be one of the ‘traditional principles 
of the professional civil service’ mentioned in Article 33(5) of the Basic Law. 
However, notwithstanding this duty, civil servants are also holders of fundamental 
rights.
Two decisions by the Bavarian administrative courts are worth exploring 
here. The first case was decided by the Higher Administrative Court of Bavaria 
(Bayerischer Verwaltungsgerichtshof, 3 B 98.563). The Court drew an analogy 
between the situation of a teacher and that of a pupil. It pointed out, however, that 
teachers generally had to comply with their duties which normally trumped their 
fundamental right to religious freedom. Furthermore, the personalities of teachers 
were fully developed and they were thus less likely to be indoctrinated by the cross. 
This means that teachers generally have to accept the cross in the classroom. The 
Court therefore chose to adopt the FCC’s stance in the case concerning the cross in 
the courtroom mentioned above and tested whether there existed a situation where 
it was intolerable for the teacher concerned to teach under the cross. In that case, 
the teacher concerned demonstrated that he was not opposed to Christianity as 
such but had an aversion to the cross as a symbol. For him, it displayed crucifixion, 
which in his eyes was the cruellest of all techniques of execution. Furthermore, 
he considered the cross a symbol of anti-Semitism and the Holocaust. The Court 
found that, for this reason, it was unacceptable for him to teach classes in front of 
the cross and upheld his claim to have it removed.
Conversely, in the second case, the Augsburg Administrative Court 
(Verwaltungsgericht Augsburg, Au 2 K 07.347) found that it was not strong enough 
a reason for an atheist teacher to politically disagree with the display of the cross. A 
situation, which did not lead to an inner conflict for the teacher, does not constitute 
an typical case. Thus the Augsburg court denied his claim. What is remarkable 
about both decisions, however, is that they offered a new interpretation of the 
cross in view of the amended legislation. Both courts argued that with the entry 
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into force of the new legislation, the legislator had changed the symbolism of the 
cross: it was now to be understood as merely a symbol for Christian and Western 
values and could no longer be construed as having a soliciting character. This 
reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of the FCC’s reasoning in the crucifix 
case. The FCC explicitly considered the intentions of the State to be irrelevant. 
Rather, it based its findings on the impression the cross left on the addressees of 
the symbol, that is pupils. Similarly, in cases involving teachers, the administrative 
courts should have considered the addressees as well.
Symbols Worn by Teachers: the Muslim Headscarf
The Ludin Saga
A new facet of the controversy surrounding religious symbols in schools became 
evident when female Muslim teachers insisted on wearing a headscarf covering 
their hair and neck while teaching. In these types of cases, the fundamental rights 
situation differs from the crucifix case law. Courts must not only reconcile the 
negative religious freedom of pupils with the State’s right to educate them and the 
State’s duty to remain neutral in matters of religion and philosophy of life. Courts 
must also take into account the teacher’s positive freedom of religion, which gives 
her a right to wear the headscarf.
This difficult situation faced the courts in the landmark Ludin case. Ludin was 
a German national, who applied to b  employed as a primary school teacher by 
the Baden-Württemberg Land having just completed her teacher training there. 
As aforementioned, teachers in Germany are normally employed as civil servants. 
Article 33 of the Basic Law regulates access to the civil service:
(2) Every German shall be equally eligible for any public office according to his 
aptitude, qualifications and professional achievements.
(3) Neither … eligibility for public office, nor rights acquired in the public service 
shall be dependent upon religious affiliation. No one may be disadvantaged by 
reason of adherence or non-adherence to a particular religious denomination or 
philosophical creed.
Article 33(2) is designed to ensure a meritocratic system, which results in the best 
candidate having a subjective right to be chosen for the office (Battis 2007). In the 
Ludin case the school authorities refused to employ Mrs Ludin, arguing that her 
insistence on wearing the headscarf in class showed that she lacked the aptitude 
to perform the job. The school authorities maintained that, as a teacher, she had 
to r present the values of the State (most notably tolerance) which it deemed 
impossible for a person wearing a headscarf. Furthermore, the school authorities 
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argued that the wearing of a headscarf by a representative of the State violated the 
State’s duty to be neutral.
Ludin in the administrative courts 
The school authorities’ decision was upheld by the Stuttgart Administrative Court, 
(Verwaltungsgericht Stuttgart, 15 K 532/99), the Higher Administrative Court of 
Baden-Württemberg (Verwaltungsgerichtshof Baden-Württemberg, 4 S 1439/00) 
and eventually the Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht, 2 
C 21.01). The main argument of the administrative courts may be summarized 
as follows. One of the criteria when assessing the aptitude of candidates is an 
evaluation of whether they will fulfil their duties. Whilst the Federal Administrative 
Court acknowledged that the wearing of a headscarf is protected by Article 4 of 
the Basic Law, it stated that the freedom of religion guaranteed therein could 
be restricted. In the court’s opinion, such a restriction follows from the State’s 
duty to be neutral in religious matters. This duty extends to teachers as well since 
they act on behalf of the State. The teacher’s personal religious freedom must 
be subordinated in such a case because schoolin  is a very sensitive area with 
young children who are easily influenced. The argument very much resembles 
that made by the Swiss Federal Court in the Dahlab case, which the ECtHR 
did not find to be unreasonable.7 Furthermore, in two decisions from the 1980s 
concerning teachers wearing Bhagwan dress, the Federal Administrative Court 
(Bundesverwaltungsgericht, 2 B 92.87) and the Higher Administrative Court of 
Hamburg (Oberverwaltungsgericht Ha burg, Bs I 171/84) argued along the same 
lines. The Federal Administrative Court found that the headscarf was a symbol 
of Islam since it was generally interpreted as an avowal to the Islamic faith. The 
Court admitted that there was no soft way of resolving the conflict: either the 
teacher was allowed to wear a headscarf or not. The Court refused, in particular, 
to allow for a trial period following which the effects of the headscarf on children 
would be assessed.
What is remarkable about the decision is that it does not once take into account 
the severe consequences for the teacher. Since the State has a quasi-monopoly on 
primary schools and since there are virtually no publicly funded Muslim primary 
schools, the decision had the consequence that the appellant would never be able 
to work as a teacher. Considering she had spent years studying for her teaching 
degree and her teacher training, this result was harsh.
Furthermore, it is worthwhile contrasting the reasoning by the administrative 
courts in the Ludin case with the decision of the Lüneburg Administrative Court 
in Lower Saxony which in 2000 had to decide a case with nearly identical facts 
(Verwaltungsgericht Lüneburg, 1 A 98/00). The arguments advanced by the school 
authorities, which refused to employ the plaintiff, were the same as in Ludin. 
The Court, however, quashed the school authorities’ decision by finding that the 
teacher’s religious freedom need not be subordinate to the State’s neutrality. In 
7 ECtHR 15 February 2001 Dahlab v. Switzerland, Application no. 42393/98.
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the eyes of the Lüneburg Court, neutrality means that a teacher must abide by the 
principle of tolerance when dealing with the different religious and philosophical 
attitudes present in a school. But the tolerance principle does not require a teacher 
to abstain from any religious avowal when in school. It pointed out that a pluralism 
of religious convictions was not only existent in schools but was also the aim of 
Lower Saxony’s school legislation. The Lüneburg Court expressly distinguished 
cases involving teachers wearing the headscarf from the crucifix decision, in 
which the situation was created by the State.
Ludin before the FCC – the majority opinion
Having lost her appeal to the Federal Administrative Court, Mrs Ludin filed a 
constitutional complaint to the Federal Constitutional Court. The FCC by a 
majority of five to three decided that her complaint was well founded (BVerfGE 
108, 282). However, it did not definitively resolve the controversial question of 
whether a teacher may wear a headscarf at school. Rather, it argued that the denial 
to employ a teacher on that basis was an interference with her fundamental rights 
enshrined in Articles 33 and 34 of the Basic Law because it happened without the 
requisite statutory foundation. Thus the FCC decided the case on the technical 
point that the Land had failed to pass legislation explicitly requiring teachers to 
refrain from wearing religious symbols in the classroom. According to the FCC’s 
‘doctrine of essentiality’ (Wesentlichkeitstheorie), interferences with fundamental 
rights must have a legislative basis. The stronger the interference, the more precise 
that basis has to be. Notably, decisions concerning the organization of schools 
cannot be left to the executive branch but must be taken by the democratically 
elected legislature (BVerfGE 108, 282, 312).
Despite its less definitive result compared with the crucifix case, the Ludin 
decision contains important remarks about the headscarf as a religious symbol 
and the right of teachers to observe their religion. The FCC emphasized that the 
question of whether a ban on the headscarf amounted to an interference with 
religious freedom had to be answered from the point of view of the woman 
wearing it. If she considers that she must wear it in order to comply with her 
religion, then the ban on the headscarf constitutes an interference. The discussion 
within the Muslim community concerning whether women are required to wear 
the headscarf or not was considered to be irrelevant. (BVerfGE 108, 282, 312). 
The FCC therefore remained true to earlier case law (BVerfGE 33, 23, 28) by 
applying a subjective test to the question of whether the wearing of the headscarf 
falls into the scope of religious freedom. However, when it comes to assessing 
whether that exercise of religious freedom interferes with the negative freedom 
of religion granted to others, in this case to pupils, it opted for an objective 
test. It held that in contrast to a cross, the headscarf was not in itself a religious 
symbol (BVerfGE 108, 282, 304). Here, the FCC adopted the perspective of the 
objective observer.
In this context, it is worth discussing a later decision by the Federal Labour 
Court (Bundesarbeitsgericht, 2 AZR 499/08) concerning a female Muslim social 
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worker employed by a school under a private contract who insisted upon wearing 
a religiously neutral cap fully covering her hair, hairline and ears while working. 
The school reprimanded her for violating § 57 of the North Rhine Westphalia 
School Act (Schulgesetz Nordrhein Westfalen). This provision was added to the 
Act after the Ludin case had been decided by the FCC and provides that teachers 
must not wear symbols which call the neutrality of the Land into question. The 
social worker, whom the Court assimilated to a teacher because it was her task to 
mediate conflicts between pupils, argued that she did not wear the cap for religious 
reasons and thus did not violate her duty to wear religiously neutral clothes. The 
reason why she chose to wear the cap at school every day was that she had been 
used to wearing a headscarf for 18 years and felt exposed if she did not cover her 
head. The Court did not accept her argument but instead adopted an objective 
approach, preferring an interpretation which seemed likely to correspond to the 
views of a considerable number of objective observers (namely, parents and 
pupils). This decision shows that the interpretation of a piece of clothing as 
amounting to a religious symbol is not only of relevance where a person wishes to 
rely on provisions protecting freedom of religion but also in cases where a person 
claims that she wears a piece of clothing without religious motivation.
Having found that the headscarf constituted a religious symbol, the FCC drew 
a clear distinction between the crucifix case, where the cross was affixed by the 
State, and the present case, in which the State was only asked to tolerate a situation 
stemming from teachers’ convictions. In the latter, the presence of religious 
symbols in public schools could not be attributed to the State (BVerfGE 108, 282, 
305). The FCC’s approach thus shows that teachers wearing the headscarf will 
fall under the ambit of the fundamental right to freedom of religion. However, it 
also indicates that since the wearing of a headscarf can lead to a conflict between 
teachers’ rights and the State’s duty to remain neutral in matters of religion and 
philosophy of life as well as with pupils’ negative right to religion and their parents’ 
right to educate their children in accordance with their convictions, restrictions on 
teachers’ rights are possible. But such restrictions, the FCC added, could not be left 
to the executive but had to be decided by the democratically elected legislature.
Ludin before the FCC – the dissenting opinion
The three dissenting judges asserted that the majority had failed to appreciate the 
specific function of teachers as civil servants. As such, teachers had voluntarily 
sided with the State and therefore deserved less protection of their fundamental 
rights than pupils and their parents (BVerfGE 108, 282, 316). They argued that a 
civil servant only enjoyed fundamental rights insofar as they were compatible with 
the civil servant’s loyalty to the State and other requirements of the job. Thus, a 
teacher ho wore a headscarf in school violated her duty to neutrality BVerfGE 
108, 282, 325). The minority maintained that the question of aptitude as contained 
in Article 33 of the Basic Law should not be confused with an interference with 
fundamental rights. They therefore did not see a need for a legislative solution as the 
incompatibility of a teacher’s headscarf with her duties could be directly derived 
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from the Basic Law. It is noteworthy that the minority opinion, in effect, denies the 
teacher any right to freedom of religion. Unlike the majority, the minority didn’t 
consider it necessary therefore to balance the teacher’s right to religious freedom 
with the neutrality of the State and the freedom of pupils and their parents. Rather, 
the three judges seemed to fully attribute the teacher’s conduct to the State and 
equate the situation with that in the crucifix decision.
Critical analysis 
The majority decision was the subject of much criticism. Most commentators 
at the time seemed to prefer the line of argument advanced by the dissenting 
minority, many critics considering the headscarf decision to be inconsistent with 
the crucifix decision (Käsnter 2003, Bader 2004, Pofalla 2004, von Campenhausen 
2004). They argued that the situation was essentially the same since pupils were 
subjected in both cases to a religious symbol in the classroom which they were 
unable to escape. These critics disagree with the FCC’s distinction between the 
cross, which was affixed to the wall of the classroo  on behalf of the State, and 
the headscarf which is worn by a teacher and merely tolerated by the State. This 
criticism is based on two notions. The first is th t a teacher, as a civil servant, is 
a representative of the State and is therefore subjected to the same restrictions as 
the State itself. The second notion is that the emphasis should be placed on the 
influence which religious symbols have on pupils, and on the interference it may 
cause with pupils’ (and their parents’) fundamental rights.
It is argued here that this view tends to be overly simplistic by neglecting the 
fact that the teacher is a bearer of fundamental rights too. The situation differs in a 
fundamental way from the situation in the crucifix decision. As Sacksofsky (2003) 
pointed out, the State’s duty to remain neutral in religious and philosophical 
matters means that the State must not identify with a certain belief. While the 
affixing of a religious symbol by the State strongly suggests such identification to 
an objective observer, a religious symbol worn by a teacher does not. Thus, the 
critics tend to block out this additional dimension and reduce the issue to a vertical 
situation where the State, through the teacher wearing the headscarf, interferes 
with the negative religious freedom of pupils and their parents. Furthermore, it 
is hardly acknowledged that teachers like the applicant do not feel they have a 
choice not to wear the headscarf. For them, it is mandatory to do so when they 
appear in public. Since the State has a quasi-monopoly on primary education, 
the consequence of the minority opinion would have been to deny the teacher 
access to the profession for which she trained for many years. Comparing Ludin 
with the crucifix decision, it is remarkable that both the majority and the minority 
decisions in Ludin had no problem in regarding the presence of a religious symbol 
in the classroom as amounting to an interference with pupils’ negative freedom 
of religion. This, it is recalled, was still very much contested in the crucifix case.
It has been suggested that the FCC deliberately avoided a clearer decision (von 
Campenhausen 2004) and even refused to decide the case (Kästner 2003). It is 
submitted that the decision not to fully determine the fate of teachers wearing 
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religious symbols in schools was the correct one. As evidenced by both the public 
and the academic discussion around the headscarf, the dilemma to be resolved 
is rather delicate. The FCC thereby gives the legislatures a choice between a 
pluralistic solution, where religious avowals are relatively unrestricted, and a 
solution closer to ‘laïcisme’, where every religious avowal outside the context of 
Religious Education is banned (BVerfGE 108, 282, 310). It is not for a court to 
decide between these two options. Rather, the principle of democracy demands 
that such decisions are made by the democratically elected legislature.
The Reaction of the Länder to the FCC’s Decision
Eight of the 16 Länder reacted and passed legislation designed to outlaw the 
wearing of headscarves by teachers. The Länder concerned opted for different 
approaches. Berlin chose an unambiguous ban of all religious symbols visibly 
worn by teachers and other civil servants (§ 2 of the Gesetz zu Artikel 29 der 
Verfassung von Berlin). Bremen took a less radical stance when legislating that 
‘the appearance of teachers in school … must not be capable of disturbing the 
religious and philosophical sentiments of pupils or their parents’ (§ 59b Bremisches 
Schulgesetz; author’s translation). While Berlin opted for a clear-cut approach, 
the Bremen legislation necessitates that each individual case involving a teacher 
wearing a headscarf or any other religious symbol to be assessed on its facts.
This contribution focuses on the legislation passed in the remaining six Länder. 
The reason is that the wording of that legislation appears to privilege Christian and 
Western traditions. In the Ludin case, the FCC emphasized that any duty not to 
wear a headscarf would only be compatible with the non-discrimination provisions 
of the Basic Law if members of different religions were treated equally (BVerfGE 
108, 282, 313). The Baden-Württemberg legislation, for instance, provides that:
Teachers at public schools … must not make political, religious, philosophical 
or similar avowals, which are capable of endangering or disturbing the 
Land’s neutrality vis-à-vis pupils and parents or a politically, religiously 
or philosophically peaceful school environment. … The realization of the 
educational mission in accordance with [the] constitution of Baden-Württemberg 
and the accordant portrayal of Christian and Western cultural and educational 
values does not contradict the conduct required of teachers [described above] (§ 
38 Schulgesetz für Baden-Württemberg; author’s translation).
In a similar vein, the Bavarian legislation states:
External symbols or clothes, which express a religious or philosophical conviction, 
must not be worn by teachers in class as far as pupils or parents can perceive these 
symbols or clothes as an expression of an attitude which is incompatible with the 
core values and the educational aims of the constitution, including Christian and 
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Law, Religious Freedoms and Education in Europe362
Western educational and cultural values (Article 59 Bayerisches Gesetz über das 
Erziehungs- und Unterrichtswesen; author’s translation).
The other Länder chose similar formulations. At least in some of the Länder, the 
references to Christian and Western culture may be explained by the objective to 
proscribe the headscarf while at the same time enabling nuns or monks teaching 
in public schools to wear their habit. This was clearly apparent from the debates 
in the Baden-Württemberg parliament (Landtag Baden-Württemberg, 4 February 
2004, Plenarprotokoll 13/62, 4399; 1 April 2004, Plenarprotokoll13/67, 4700, 
4704, 4710, 4717, 4719) and until recently also featured on a website run by the 
Bavarian school ministry containing information for head teachers on ‘Islam in 
Schools’, which expressly stated that the habit of nuns was not affected by the 
legislation as it was a reflection of Christian and Western values (Dicks 2008). 
That a nun’s habit would normally be covered by the ban is clear since it is an 
expression of a religious conviction. Therefore, the reference to Christian and 
Western values has given rise to challenges of that legislation in the courts. On the 
basis of the newly phrased provision in Baden-Württemberg, Mrs Ludin lost her 
final appeal before the Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht, 
2 C 45/03). One of her arguments was that the legislation was unconstitutional 
because it violated the principle of equal treatment contained in Article 3 of the 
Basic Law. The Federal Administrative Court interpreted the provision in the 
same way as the FCC had construed similar references in its school decisions. 
The reference to Christian and Western cultural and educational values is to be 
understood not as a reference to Christian doctrine and religious belief as such 
but to values, which originated in Christianity but which are universally valid, 
even outside the religious context, such as the protection of human dignity, non-
discrimination between the genders or religious freedom. The provisions of most 
other Länder have in the mean time been subjected to challenges of compatibility 
with the Basic Law. All of them have been upheld on the basis of similar arguments 
as the ones used by the Federal Administrative Court in the second Ludin case 
(Hessischer Verfassungsgerichtshof, P. St 2016; Bundesarbeitsgericht, 2 AZR 
55/09; Verwaltungsgericht Düsseldorf, 2 K 6225/06). The FCC has not yet been 
called upon to rule.
The only court deviating from this line of argument was the Bavarian 
Constitutional Court, which upheld the Bavarian provision on different grounds 
(Bayerischer Verfassungsgerichtshof, Vf. 11-VII-05). Concerning the principle 
of equal treatment, the court stated that the legislation did not contain an 
objectionable privilege in favour of the Christian faith since the reference had to 
be understood as meaning Christian values independent of the actual doctrine. The 
court nonetheless concluded that some symbols may be in accordance with these 
values and others may not. Thus, some symbols and some types of clothing may 
be worn by teachers, and others may not. The latter statement deviates from the 
statements made in other proceedings. The Bavarian Court does not suggest that, in 
conformity with constitutional principles, all religious symbols should be illegal. 
© Copyrighted Material
© Copyrighted Material
ww
w.
as
hg
at
e.
co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  
Of Crucifixes and Headscarves: Religious Symbols in German Schools 363
Rather, the Court appears to accept that unequal treatment is permissible to so e 
extent in view of the Christian and Western heritage of Bavaria. The Court did not 
have to elaborate further on these statements since the complaint was a popular 
complaint based on Article 98 of the Bavarian Constitution by which everyone 
may have Bavarian legislation reviewed by the court as to its compatibility with 
the fundamental rights contained in the Bavarian constitution independently of 
litigation and a set of facts. One can easily conclude, however, that the court would 
generally be willing to accept a ban on the headscarf and yet allow teaches to wear 
Christian or Jewish religious clothes or symbols. It is submitted that the Bavarian 
approach would not be shared by the Federal Administrative Court or the FCC.
Challenges under Equality Law Provisions
So far, this contribution has focused on violations of freedom religion guaranteed 
under Article 4 of the Basic Law. However, in light of the fact that many cases 
under English law would be argued under anti-discrimination law as well, it seems 
appropriate to briefly address the courts’ reactions to arguments based on equal 
treatment provisions both in the Basic Law and in the federal legislation implementing 
the EU’s equal treatment directives (Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz – AGG) 
which entered into force in August 2006, that is after the second Ludin decision. 
Article 3 of the Basic Law guarantees a right to equal treatment. Furthermore, 
Article 33(2) of the Basic Law is also an equal treatment provision. The FCC in 
Ludin regarded the refusal of school authorities to employ Mrs Ludin as amounting 
to an interference with her right to equal access to a public office and emphasized 
that such an interference could not be justified in the absence of an explicit 
legislative basis. The FCC then stressed that any such legislation would have to 
guarantee equal treatment of all religions (BVerfGE 108, 282, 313).
After the entry into force of the legislation implementing the EU’s directives 
on equal treatment, applicants were able to rely on these provisions alongside 
those of the Basic Law. Article 31 of the Basic Law provides for the precedence of 
federal law over Länder law. Since the AGG is federal law, the Länder legislation 
banning religious symbols has to be compliant with it. Furthermore, any dismissal 
of an employee or refusal to employ a prospective employee must not infringe the 
AGG. This is also true where civil servants are concerned since §24 AGG provides 
that the Act also applies to the public sector. The AGG has unsuccessfully been 
invoked in a number of cases concerning the headscarf. The discriminations on 
grounds of religion were deemed justified in each instance (Verwaltungsgerichtshof 
Baden Württemberg, 4 S 516/07; Verwaltungsgericht Düsseldorf, 2 K 6225/06 (5 
June 2007).
In the case of the social worker, mentioned above, the Federal Labour Court 
admitted a direct discrimination on the basis of religion but considered that 
discrimination to be justified under § 8 AGG, which provides that a ‘difference 
of treatment … shall not constitute discrimination where, by reason of the nature 
of the particular occupational activities or of the context in which they are carried 
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out, such grounds constitute a genuine and determining occupational requirement, 
provided that the objective is legitimate and the requirement is proportionate’. 
The Federal Labour Court considered the restriction to serve a legitimate purpose, 
namely the preservation of a peaceful school environment. It was also deemed 
proportionate since the ban would only affect her during the school day and since 
it served the purpose of protecting the negative freedom of religion of others 
(Bundesarbeitsgericht 2 AZR 499/08). In another case, a female Muslim Turkish 
language teacher was dismissed for insisting on wearing the headscarf in class even 
though she only taught pupils of Turkish origin all of whom were Muslims. The 
Federal Labour Court upheld the dismissal with the same reasoning as in the case 
just discussed and regarded the discrimination to be justified (Bundesarbeitsgericht 
2 AZR 55/09).
What is remarkable about these two cases is that the Federal Labour Court, 
without any discussion, adopted the reasoning of the administrative courts, 
ignoring the fundamental difference between a teacher or social worker who is 
employed under private law and a civil servant. While there is some room for 
the argument that civil servants represent the State and therefore have to accept 
more far reaching restrictions of their fundamental rights, this is not the case 
for private law employees. Furthermore, upholding the dismissal of the Turkish 
language teacher who only taught Muslims goes rather far. As is evident from 
paragraph 23 of the preamble to Directive 2000/78/EC, on which the AGG is 
based, discrimination can only be justified in ‘very limited circumstances’. It is 
submitted that the Federal Labour Court failed to appreciate the very exceptional 
nature of the justification provision in this case.
It is further noteworthy that none of the decisions mentions § 4 AGG, which 
deals with multiple discriminations and requires justification under all those 
grounds. In the case of the ban on the headscarf, the courts are not only confronted 
with a potential discrimination on the basis of religion but also an indirect 
discrimination on the basis of gender (Vickers 2008). This failure to appreciate 
the existence of multiple discriminations in these cases is evidence of a slightly 
underdeveloped anti-discrimination jurisprudence by the German courts.
Overall Comments
The Ludin decision, albeit much-criticized, has provided a certain degree of legal 
certainty with regard to religious symbols and religiously inspired clothing worn 
by teachers. Where a Land wishes to ban such symbols, it must do so by way of 
legislation and must not discriminate between religions. With the exception of 
the Bavarian Constitutional Court, all courts held that a reference to the Land’s 
Christian and Western heritage could not lead to a privileging of Christian and 
Western religious convictions. Rather, this reference must be understood to mean 
that the Western values marked by Christianity are to inspire teaching and cannot 
allow for indoctrination of Christian religious content.
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The legislation of the eight Länder has created a situation for schools and 
teachers, which comes quite close to ‘laïcisme’. They are effectively banned from 
avowing to any religious belief when in school. To some observers this may seem 
ironic since the legislation, which contains explicit references to the Christian and 
Western heritage, was passed by Länder parliaments with a strong conservative 
majority consisting mainly of Germany’s Christian parties. Examples are the 
Christian Social Union in Bavaria and the Christian Democratic Union in Hesse, 
Baden-Württemberg, Lower Saxony, North Rhine Westphalia and Saarland.
Symbols Worn by Pupils: Any Room for Regulation In View of Religious Freedom?
The final point which this contribution briefly aims to address is the situation of 
pupils. At present there is no legislation or executive practice banning pupils from 
wearing religious symbols in schools. Yet the political discussion revolving around 
immigration and integration has recently seen some politicians and commentators 
call for a ban of the headscarf even for pupils (Akgün 2009, Sarrazin 2009). 
According to media reports, a few head teachers have tried to ban the headscarf 
in their schools (Dicks 2008, Spiegel Online 2010b). Yet, in each case the school 
authorities were quick to lift the ban.
Viewed from the perspective of the law, it would be very difficult to achieve 
such a ban in a constitutional manner. The Ludin case showed that a ban of the 
headscarf for teachers would require a legislative basis and could not merely be 
imposed by the executive. Since the interference with pupils’ freedom of religion 
would be at least as strong, there is much reason to believe that any such ban 
for pupils would have to be passed by the legislature. Of course, a ban on the 
headscarf only would not be possible either. In view of Article 3 of the Basic Law, 
which prohibits discrimination, the legislation would have to treat all religions 
equally and ban all religious symbols.
But even if that were to happen, such a ban would probably be considered an 
unconstitutional interference with the pupils’ freedom of religion by the FCC. That 
there would be an interf rence with that freedom is clear from the Ludin case and 
needs no further discussion. When it comes to justifying that interference, the 
fundamental difference between a teacher and a pupil in school would become 
pertinent. Pupils, at least until they have completed nine years of schooling,8 are 
subjected to compulsory education. This means that they have to attend school. If 
they were not allowed to wear the headscarf in school, this would in effect result 
in the State forcing them to violate their religious duty, which would constitute 
a grave interference with their freedom of religion. This interference could only 
be justified to protect other conflicting constitutional principles, such as the 
fundamental rights of others. In contrast to a teacher, where the neutrality of the 
State in religious and philosophical matters constitutes such a colliding principle, 
it would be hard to find a pressing interest to justify a similar ban for pupils. As 
8 The length of compulsory education differs between the Länder.
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has been pointed out, the neutrality of the German State in religious matters is not 
to be confused with laïcité. Thus, the reasoning of the Turkish State justifying the 
ban of the headscarf in Turkish universities in the Şahin case before the ECtHR 
would not work for Germany.
One argument for a ban would be to consider it necessary to protect young girls 
from being forced to wear the headscarf. Apart from the difficulties of distilling 
the State’s duty to protect pupils from the Basic Law, this would have to be 
squared with parents’ right to bring up their children according to their religious 
convictions, which is guaranteed by the Basic Law. This right inevitably involves 
a degree of religious indoctrination. Thus a ban on the headscarf for pupils would 
interfere with their parents’ rights as well.
This line of argument finds some support in the Federal Administrative 
Court’s decision on the right of a Muslim pupil not to be forced to take part in 
classes of physical education where boys and girls are taught in mixed classes 
(Bundesverwaltungsgericht, 6 C 8/91). The Court acknowledged that the state has 
a right to educate pupils arising from Article 7 of the Basic Law and that this right 
was of equal weight as the pupil’s religious freedom, which demanded that she 
had to wear wide dresses and a headscarf so that male pupils would not be able 
to see her body shape. However, the court held that the state would have had the 
choice of teaching physical education in single sex classes. Thus the pupil’s right 
to freedom of religion prevailed.
It would therefore be very difficult for a school or even the legislator to ban 
pupils from wearing a headscarf in school. Even though they are run by a religiously 
neutral State, schools are places which are open to religious avowals of the pupils 
attending them. This shows the difference between the German cooperative model 
of State/Church relations and the French and Turkish models of laïcité.
Conclusion
The controversies surrounding religious symbols in schools are testimonies of 
Germany’s pluralistic society. Since politicians tend to shun making decisions 
which affect people’s religion, these controversies are often decided in the courts. 
As a result, there is now a relatively settled case law on religious symbols. The 
courts interpret these symbols from the point of view of an objective observer. 
However, when deciding whether a religious symbol is compulsory for the person 
wearing it, the courts adopt a subjective test. Furthermore, the courts now seem to 
accept that a religious symbol can interfere with other people’s negative freedom 
of religion. The situation for teachers wearing a headscarf has been clarified to 
a large extent. In the Länder which introduced a ban on the headscarf, teachers 
who wear a headscarf may be refused employment and those who are employed 
can be dismissed if they insist on wearing it in class. In the Länder which did not 
legislate for a ban, it is clear from the Ludin case that teachers are allowed to wear 
it. This fragmentation of the legal situation in the different Länder is regrettable 
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but inherent in a federal system. The only way in which teacher wishing to wear 
a headscarf in schools might still be successful is under EU’s anti-discrimination 
law. As this contribution has shown, the case law of the German courts in this 
respect is not developed in a very sophisticated manner. It is only a matter of time 
until the Court of Justice of the European Union will be asked to address these 
questions as well.
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